
The Four Horsemen, from The Apocalypse c. 1498 Albrecht Dürer
By Pieter Hundersmarck.
"And I looked, and behold a pale horse: and his name that sat on him was Death, and Hell followed with him." - Johnny Cash, "The Man Comes Around"
History is full of valuable lessons. Because things rarely repeat exactly as they did in the past, the lessons are more general than specific. We end up with rules of thumb to abide by, rather than clear relationships of cause and effect.
Such is the case for bull and bear markets. The economist Hyman Minsky described the economic pattern decades ago: stability breeds confidence, confidence breeds risk-taking, and accumulated risk eventually produces the instability that ends the cycle. When there are no recessions, people become overconfident. When they become overconfident, they take on too much risk. When risk accumulates, it leads to recessions.
Bull markets ultimately give way to bear markets. Understanding why this happens can provide investors with the greatest opportunities for gain, or protect them from the greatest losses.
But what triggers a sell-off? Does it start in the stock market or the economy? Is it something we can analyze and learn from? History offers a few rules of thumb.
In the Book of Revelation, four riders bring an end to the world as it was known: one carries a set of scales, one wears a crown, one brings Death with Hell following behind, and one takes peace from the earth. Bull markets have their own four horsemen, and they map onto the originals more closely than one might expect.
A caveat before we begin: the horsemen rarely ride alone. Most bear markets combine two or more of them, and the categories below describe the dominant trigger rather than the only one.
The first horseman: Rising interest rates
The rider on the black horse carries a set of scales, weighing out the price of bread.
In markets, the price that matters most is the price of money. Warren Buffett has described interest rates as acting on asset prices the way gravity acts on matter. Central banks raise rates to slow the economy, and in doing so they slow earnings growth and lower the multiple investors are willing to pay for those earnings.
The more dangerous effect is on leverage. Higher rates raise the cost of borrowing to own assets. When margin calls cannot be met, leveraged positions are unwound, losses feed on themselves and panic follows. Few assets escape: long-duration growth stocks fall furthest, but large, liquid companies are sold too, precisely because they are the easiest holdings to turn into cash.
The run-up to 1929 illustrates the mechanism. The Federal Reserve tightened through 1928 and 1929, raising the New York discount rate to 6% in August 1929, while the cost of broker loans used to buy shares on margin rose sharply. Economic historians still debate how much of the crash itself can be attributed to monetary policy. There is broader agreement, following Friedman and Schwartz, that tight money turned the downturn that followed into the Great Depression.
A second example sits in the housing market. When Paul Volcker raised rates to break inflation, the 30-year mortgage rate peaked above 18% in 1981. Existing-home sales, which had peaked at about four million in 1978, halved to about two million by 1982 (see chart). It took until 1996 before sales exceeded the 1978 level. This was not the bursting of a credit bubble. It was the price of money doing exactly what it was intended to do.

Source: National Association of Realtors. Shaded areas indicate US recessions.
What to watch: real interest rates (policy rates above inflation), an inverted yield curve, which has preceded most US recessions since the 1960s, and the pace of tightening relative to the level of debt in the system.
The second horseman: a loss of faith, and self-perpetuation thereof, in the continued rise of the market.
The rider on the white horse wears a crown and rides out conquering.
Every bull market has its conquering narrative, and every narrative eventually meets a price it cannot justify. Sometimes valuations simply become detached from any plausible future. This can happen in the absence of a recession: as was the case in the dot com crash when the Nasdaq Composite fell about 78% between March 2000 and October 2002, and the S&P 500 roughly halved. The Federal Reserve had been raising rates, but the more fundamental problem was that investors had paid prices that assumed decades of flawless growth.
At other times the trigger is a change in expectations rather than in reality. In the taper tantrum of 2013, the mere suggestion that the Federal Reserve would slow its bond purchases pushed the 10-year Treasury yield from about 1.6% to nearly 3% within months, although equities fell only modestly. In October 2018, Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell remarked that interest rates were "a long way from neutral". The Fed had been raising rates since December 2015, but investors read the comment as a signal that it would keep going and would no longer support asset prices. The S&P 500 fell about 7% in October, and December 2018 was the index's worst December since 1931. No recession followed. Had the economy weakened at the same time, the sell-off would likely have turned into one.
The lesson is that sentiment can move faster than fundamentals, and that the higher the starting valuation, the less bad news is needed to change it.
What to watch: valuation measures such as the cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings ratio, the level of margin debt, the concentration of index returns in a handful of popular names, and the volume of new issues (IPOs) coming to market.
The third horseman: Credit breaking in a vulnerable part of the system
The rider on the pale horse is Death, and Hell followed with him.
This horseman starts in one place and spreads. Here the trigger is a transmission from a vulnerable part of the economy or the financial system to the stock market. Most often that part is housing, because property is bought with borrowed money and sits on the balance sheets of banks. A run-up in property prices, low interest rates and a relaxation of lending standards by banks led directly to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, which followed the bursting of real estate bubbles in several countries.
Bubbles in real estate are more dangerous than bubbles in shares. The IMF found that among industrial countries between 1970 and 2001, equity price busts occurred on average every thirteen years, lasted about two and a half years and cost roughly four percent of GDP. Housing price busts were less frequent, but lasted nearly twice as long and led to output losses about twice as large.
The weak point need not be housing. In 1998 the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, a highly leveraged hedge fund, threatened the banks that had lent to it and contributed to a fall of about 19% in the S&P 500 within a few months. The common thread is leverage concentrated where few people are looking.
What to watch: credit spreads on corporate and high-yield bonds, bank lending standards, rapid growth in credit to a single sector, and property prices rising well ahead of incomes.
The fourth horseman: war and other shocks from outside
The rider on the red horse is given power to take peace from the earth.
This is the horseman that arrives from outside the financial system altogether. Prolonged conflict between large economies creates enormous uncertainty, and markets respond poorly to uncertainty. Conflict creates winners and losers. On the winning side we see increased government spending, monetisation, higher inflation and greater state intervention. On the losing side we see financial and social ruin.
History is more nuanced than the headline suggests, however. US equities reached their wartime low in April 1942, long before the outcome was clear, and rose through most of the remainder of the Second World War. For investors on the winning side, the greater long-term risk was often inflation rather than the war itself.
A conflict between the United States and the bloc of rival powers formed by China, Russia and North Korea is one such possibility. Such a conflict would most likely begin through proxies or flashpoints, as the war in Ukraine and tensions around Taiwan already suggest. Although a global war seems out of the question to most of us, it always does, right up to the point that it happens.
War is not the only shock of this kind. The October 1987 crash, when the Dow Jones fell 22.6% in a single day, and the Covid crash of 2020, when the S&P 500 fell about 34% in five weeks, both came from outside the ordinary economic cycle. Such shocks are by nature impossible to forecast. What can be assessed is how fragile the system is when they arrive.
What to watch: there are no reliable leading indicators here. The practical questions are how much leverage and liquidity risk a portfolio carries, and how exposed it is to supply chains, energy and regions that a conflict would disrupt.
How do we prepare?
The most famous prediction of the Wall Street crash of 1929 was made by Roger Babson. On 5 September 1929 he told an audience, "Sooner or later a crash is coming, and it may be terrific." The market fell about 3% that afternoon, a decline known as the Babson Break. The crash followed seven weeks later.
Less often told is that Babson had been warning of a crash for several years before 1929. Anyone who sold on his earlier warnings missed a large part of one of the great bull markets in history. He was right about the conditions and early on the timing, and that is the most useful lesson his story offers: the horsemen can be seen gathering, but no one can say with confidence when they will ride.
Babson was a prolific writer and thinker, and he had ten commandments he followed in investing and encouraged his readers to follow too:
Keep speculation and investment separate.
Don't be fooled by a name.
Be wary of new promotions.
Give due consideration to marketability [liquidity].
Don't buy without proper facts.
Safeguard purchases by diversity.
Don't try to diversify by buying different securities of the same company.
Small companies should be carefully scrutinised.
Buy adequate security, not super-abundance.
Choose your dealer and buy outright [do not buy on margin].
Babson understood that investment and speculation could coexist, provided they were kept apart. His rules counsel wariness of leverage (buying outright rather than on margin), of new promotions and of well-regarded names. They ask the investor to consider marketability, meaning how easily a holding can be sold when it needs to be, and they place great faith in diversification.
There are very few ways to avoid a bear market altogether. What investors can do is recognize which horsemen are gathering, watch the signals set out above, and build a portfolio that does not depend on knowing when they will arrive: properly diversified, bought outright, liquid enough to be sold if needed and free of speculative issues.
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Pieter Hundersmarck is a Chief Investment Officer and Portfolio Manager with almost 20 years experience building investment capabilities for asset managers and family offices from the ground up, including asset allocation, philosophy, process, people and investment operations end to end. He was most recently CIO at a single family office based in Amsterdam, and has led investment strategies across listed equity, fund of funds, private equity and impact investments. He founded Walker Bay Capital Advisory in 2026 to advise high-net-worth individuals and families on their wealth and investment strategies.

